Civil War and the Social Contract by Azam, Jean-Paul & Mesnard, Alice
Revised April 2001
Civil War and the Social Contract
by
Jean-Paul Azama,b and Alice Mesnarda
a : ARQADE, University of Toulouse
b : IDEI, Institut Universitaire de France, and CSAE, Oxford.
Abstract : In this contract-theoretic model the government promises a transfer to its
potential opponent in return for not engaging in a civil war. Two causes of civil war are
identified. First, imperfect credibility increases the cost of the required transfer, and may
make it unfeasible. Second, asymmetric information faces the government with the classic
trade off between efficiency and rent-extraction, and civil war is used as a screening device.
However, the latter problem can be solved by creating a mixed army, at a cost. The model
determines also whether a military regime or a redistributive state prevails in a peaceful
equilibrium. A statistical illustration is presented, using African data.
Paper prepared for the Royal Economic Society Conference,
Durham, 9-11  April 2001.
Corresponding author :   Jean-Paul Azam
ARQADE, University of Toulouse,
21 Allée de Brienne, 31000 Toulouse, France,
e-mail : azam@univ-tlse1.fr
1While political violence is tearing the African continent apart, where most of the new
civil wars break out since the end of the cold war, the economic analysis of conflicts has
made significant progress during the 1990s. It offers a series of theoretical models, with
some econometric application, that enhance our understanding of the rationality of the
agents involved, within a deficient institutional framework. In particular, the role of ethnic
division, often presented as the main determinant of civil wars has been downplayed by
many papers, and in particular by Collier and Hoeffler (1998). Many ethnically divided
societies avoid internal strife, and the organisation of groups along ethnic lines is seen more
as a determinant of the pattern of the conflicts than as a cause of their breakout. Nowadays,
the emphasis is put on the economic determinants, and on the deficient organisation of the
state.
Grossman (1991) is the basic reference in this literature, analysing the problem of a
government choosing the level of its military expenditures for reducing the probability of
being overthrown by an insurrection. Kuran (1989) provides a complementary analysis,
looking at the free-rider problem involved in organising an insurrection. Skaperdas (1992),
Hirshleifer (1995) and Grossman and Kim (1995) analyse the properties of the conflict
technology and their consequences for the equilibrium of the model. A synthesis of this
literature, with a comparison with ‘rent-seeking’ models, is presented by Neary (1997). A
tension in this literature is brought out by Skaperdas (1992) who points out that the
occurrence of the conflict is not really explained, as the contending parties could agree
beforehand to share the resources according to the expected values of their takes from the
fight. In these models, the contenders are indifferent between fighting and sharing the
resources peacefully. The contract-theoretic framework presented below deals with this
issue, by discussing some implementation problems that may result in a war.
A new perspective is open by Azam (1995) showing that the ruling party does not
need to rely exclusively on defence for staying in power, but can combine a policy of
redistribution in favour of its opponent with military deterrence, thereby reducing the
incentive to rebel. Azam et al. (1996) perform an econometric test of the effect of public
expenditures with a strong redistributive content, like education and health, on the
2probability of the outbreak of political violence. This line of analysis is pushed further in
Azam (2001), who brings out the role of the imperfect credibility of the government’s
commitment to redistribute in causing war, and gives examples taken from sub-Saharan
Africa. In the same vein, Acemoglu and Robinson (2000) argue that the extension of the
franchise in the West during the 19th century was a commitment device used by the rulers to
prevent a revolution. However, this argument cannot be used in many developing
countries, and in particular in sub-Saharan Africa, where social classes do not matter much,
whereas ethnic rivalry is tantamount. There, many examples suggest that majority rule may
lead to a dictatorship in favour of one ethnic group, oppressing the others and threatening
civil peace. Azam (2001) discusses various commitment devices used by African
governments.
The model presented here belongs to this line of research, and emphasises the part
played by the government’s ability to commit credibly to its announced redistributive
expenditures in determining whether war or peace will prevail in equilibrium. It is couched
in contract-theoretic terms, and brings out two different causes of war, related either to
commitment failure or to asymmetric information. The former is captured by a notion of
imperfect commitment, described by the probability of the government keeping its word.
The model also determines endogenously what type of political system, either a military
regime or a redistributive state, will prevail in a peaceful equilibrium. Beside this case where
the government cannot afford a social contract ensuring peace, because of the commitment
failure just described, this paper also discusses the problems raised by asymmetric
information about the fighting efficiency of the potential rebels relative to the government’s
troupes. The government will sometimes run the risk of civil war, as a screening device. A
simple extension of this model shows how this screening could instead be performed by
forming a mixed army, requiring the potential rebels to contribute to peacetime defence
expenditures, but this costs more than a pooling contract.
The model is presented in section 1, while the commitment problems are discussed
in section 2. Section 3 is devoted to asymmetric information, and section 4 presents the case
for a mixed army. A glance is given at some African data in section 5 in order to gauge the
3relevance of this framework for explaining simultaneously the occurrence of civil wars and
the type of political systems prevailing in peaceful countries.
1. The Model
There are two groups, indexed by G and E, for government and excluded,
respectively. We neglect the collective action problems that might prevent the formation of
such groups in the real world, or affect their behaviour (see Kuran, 1989 and Noh,1999),
assuming that each group behaves as a unitary agent. The forces that they engage in the
conflict are denoted FG  ³ 0 and FE  ³ 0, respectively. The conflict technology is described by
the probability p of the government being overthrown by the rebels, determined as follows:
· p = 1,  if  m FE ³ FG  and FG < w , (1)
· p = y , 0 < y < 1, if  m FE ³ FG  ³ w , (2)
· p = 0,  if  m FE < FG . (3)
The parameter m represents the fighting efficiency of the rebel troupes relative to the
governmental ones. This may reflect both the warfare technology, more or less favourable to
the government or the guerrilla, and more ideological weapons, like the degree of political
mobilisation or the morale of the army or of the rebellion troupes. We take this as
exogenous, although Herbst (2000) has recently produced an illuminating political analysis
of the means used by guerrilla leaders to enhance this efficiency, in Africa. The parameter w
captures a scale effect in the defence technology of the government, such that a minimum
level of defence expenditures is required, to avoid being ousted by any odd challenge
otherwise.
Given this warfare technology, the government can either fight with the excluded
group, or pay the price of peace, i.e. give away to the potential rebels a transfer equivalent to
the expected value of their catch in case of war (Azam, 2001). Skaperdas (1992) notes that a
transfer could settle the dispute by giving each contender the expected value of his take
4from the conflict, but this raises some implementation problems, for building the right
institutional framework for a peaceful state, which are the focus of the present paper.
The game takes place in three stages :
(i) The government engages FG and offers to the excluded group the following
contract : ‘I give you g ³ 0 if you choose F
F
E
G<
m
’. However, because of the imperfect
commitment technology available to the government, it is known that the transfer g will
only be effected with probability l, which measures the credibility of the government.
(ii) The excluded group chooses its forces FE and the conflict takes place if   F
F
E
G³
m
.
(iii) The transfer g is delivered with probability l if the conflict was avoided, and the
players get the payoffs described below.
The expected utility of the government is :
U p y F gG G G= - - -( )( )1 g l , (4)
where g > 1 reflects the cost of running an army, assumed higher than its opportunity cost,
because of the negative externality that it may entail (disruption of economic activity,
uncontrolled violence, etc.), and yG >g w  is the exogenous endowment of the government,
capturing all the taxes, levies, and royalties that the government collects. The government
faces the following budget constraint :
y F gG G- - ³g 0. (5)
Knowing that p g =  0, and denoting yE the exogenous endowment of the excluded
group, the expected utility of the latter is :
U y F g p y F gE E E G G= - + + - -l g l( ) . (6)
This formulation captures clearly the stakes of the civil war, namely the transfer with
probability p of the remaining resources of the government to the excluded group.
5Definitions 1 : Denoting FE
W and FE
P , as the excluded group’s forces in case of war and
peace, respectively, and pW = 1 if FG < w and pW = y  if FG ³ w, define
(i) the  peace dividend  as l g FE
W+ ; and
(ii)  the return to war  as p y FW G G( )- g .
The former is the sum of the expected transfer and the cost of conflict saved by not
waging the war, while the latter is the expected value of the take from the government in
case of war. We can now prove the following:
Proposition 1 : (i) the excluded group accepts the social contract, with FE
P = 0, if the
following participation constraint holds :
l g FE
W+  ³ p y FW G G( )- g , (7)
i.e. if the peace dividend is at least as large as the return to war ;
(ii) it wages the war, with F
F
E
W G=
m
 otherwise.
Proof : In case of peace, the excluded group seeks to
max . .U y F g st F
F
E
P
E E
P
E
P G= - + £ <l
m
0 ,
entailing FE
P = 0, and in case of war, it seeks to :
m
g GWEGG
WW
EE
W
E
F
FtsFypFyU ³-+-= ..)(max ,
entailing F
F
E
W G=
m
. Then, U UE
P
E
W³ implies (7). QED
Condition (7) means that peace must give the excluded group at least as much as the
expected value of what it could capture by war, if the former is to be chosen. It also hints at
the social gain from peace, namely the resources saved from being engaged in the war by
the excluded group. It also shows that the government faces a trade off between promising
more transfer or increasing its defence expenditures as a way to deter rebellion. The larger
the forces engaged by the government, the lower the expected value of the transfer required
to fulfil this constraint, which is represented at figure 1, after substituting from (ii) into (7).
6In order to proceed further, we need the following lemma :
Proposition 2 : The government chooses FG ³ w  in all cases.
Proof : See appendix.
Figure 1
The intuition for proposition 2 is straightforward : if the government does not
engage at least this minimum level of forces, then its expected gain is zero, while if it does,
the budget constraint ensures that the remaining resources are non negative.
2. Commitment Failure
In this section, we analyse how the imperfect credibility of the government promise
to redistribute part of its resources can lead to a civil war.
Definitions 2 : (i) A feasible  social contract is a pair {g, FG} such that both the participation
constraint (7)  and the budget constraint (5) hold simultaneously. This requires :
l y
m g
³ -
-
F
y F
G
G G( )
. (8)
(ii) A social contract is desirable  for the government if :
Peace
War
w
FGmy
y g m
yG
1+
yG
l
g
y
l
y g m
w
lm
yG - +( )1
7( )( ) ( )( )1 1- - + ³ - -y g
m
y g wy F
F
yG G
G
G . (9)
Notice that (8) is trivially satisfied if l ³ y. Credibility problems may thus arise when
the probability of toppling the government by a civil war is higher than the probability of
the government keeping its promise of a transfer. Then, the government must compensate
this credibility gap by increasing its defence expenditures, for reducing the return to war.
The left-hand side of (9) is the expected resources left to the government after promising the
minimum transfer required to ensure peace, while the right-hand side is the expected
resources left in case of war. This condition holds trivially if 1 ³ m g (1-y). Otherwise, it
requires :
FG £
-
- -
mg y w
m g y
( )
( )
1
1 1
. (10)
Condition (10) gives the maximum value that the government is prepared to invest
in defence, when m is relatively large. Beyond that level, it is cheaper to go for a war. Define
FGMax as the right-hand side of condition (10), noticing that it is always larger than w.
Figure 2
These conditions determine jointly the opportunity set within which the government
chooses the social contract offered. It might be empty for some values of the parameters. In
this case, civil war is the only option left. Figure 2 depicts a case where, given FGMax and the
other parameters, there exists a range of values of l < lMin such that there is no social
Civil War
   Range
l
 1
y
lMin
FGMax
FG
Desirable
Unfeasible
Feasible
Undesirable
Unfeasible
Undesirable
Feasible
Desirable
8contract that is both feasible and desirable. The downward sloping curve is the feasibility
frontier, i.e. the minimum value of l such that (8) holds. The vertical line represents the
maximum value of FG such that desirable contracts exist, i.e. such that (10) holds. These
curves partition this space in four zones, corresponding to social contracts that are feasible
(above the feasibility frontier) or not, or desirable (to the left of FGMin) or not. Their
intersection determines lMin , below which a civil war breaks out, as no feasible social
contract is then desirable for the government. This result may be stated formally as :
Proposition 3 : If m
g y
>
-
1
1( )
, the civil war breaks out if :
l l y
m g
< = -
-Min
GMax
G GMax
F
y F( )
 . (11)
Peace prevails otherwise.
Proof : Conditions (8) and (10) must hold jointly in order for peace to be chosen by the
government, while (11) makes this impossible. If 1 ³ m g (1-y) the social contract is always
desirable to the government. QED
The intuition for this result is that low credibility makes the level of transfer required
for peace very costly to the government, inducing the latter to move along the trade off
identified at figure 1, and rely on higher defence expenditures. Beyond a point, the latter
become more costly than accepting the risk of a civil war. Otherwise, when the credibility of
the government makes the set of feasible and desirable contracts non empty, it will choose
either FG = w, or the point on the feasibility frontier corresponding to the given value of l,
whichever is the largest. This strategy minimises the cost of maintaining peace.
Definitions 3 : (i) a redistributive state is a government that chooses FG = w,  thus relying
mainly on redistribution, and (ii) a military regime  is a government relying on a higher level
of defence expenditures for deterring rebellion.
9We can now characterise further the set of social contracts prevailing in peaceful
equilibria as follows :
Proposition 4 : (i) A redistributive state is in operation if l l m
g y
> >
-Min
 and
1
1( )
 ;
(ii)  a military regime prevails if either :
(a) l l m
g y
= ³ >
-Min
0 and
1
1( )
 , then F
y
G
G=
-
+ -
( )
( )
y l m
y l mg1
, or
(b)  m
g y
<
-
1
1( )
, in which case F
y
G
G=
+
my
y g m1
and g = 0, or
(c)  m
g y
=
-
1
1( )
, in which case F
y
G
GÎ
+
é
ë
ê
ù
û
úw
my
y g m
,
1
.
Proof : In case of peace, if l > lMin  the government solves :
min . ( ),g F G G G
G
G
g F g y F
F
l g l y g
m
+ ³ - -s.t .
Then (i) and (ii.b) and (ii.c) follow immediately, knowing proposition 2. Case (ii.a) follows
from the discussion above, as condition (8) holds in this case with equality. QED
Figure 3
Figure 4 summarises this proposition, by partitioning the (l, m) space. The upward
sloping curve represents the lMin frontier, along which we have a military regime
corresponding to case (ii.a). Above it, the government has enough credibility to maintain
l
 1
 y
Military
 Regime
Redistributive
       State
Civil War
lMin
 m
1
1g y( )-
1
1 1g y
w
y y g w( ) ( )( )-
+
- -yG
 0
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peace by offering the social contract described above. Below it, the government cannot
afford this, and the civil war breaks out. The vertical line represents the borderline between
the set of {l, m} pairs for which a military regime prevails and the redistributive state zone,
corresponding to case (ii.c). To its left, we have a military regime proper, corresponding to
case (ii.b), without any redistribution at all (g = 0). In all the other cases of peaceful
equilibria, some redistribution occurs, in order to fulfil the excluded group’s participation
constraint.
We now extend the model to deal with asymmetric information problems, providing
another cause of civil war.
3. Asymmetric Information
 
 We now assume away the problems raised by the imperfect credibility of the
government’s  promise of  a  transfer. We focus instead on asymmetric information, by
assuming that the excluded group can have either a high or a low fighting efficiency relative
to the government’s forces. At stage 1 of the game, the excluded group knows its own type,
{ }m m m m mÎ >H L H L, , , while the government only knows its probability distribution, such
that m m= H with probability p, assumed different from 0 or 1. We can think of m mH L-  as a
measure of the government ignorance, or in a more dynamic way as a positive shock
affecting the relative fighting efficiency of the excluding group, treating mL  as the normal
state of affairs, and mH  as the result of a positive shock occurring with probability p. We
refer to m mH L-   as the m-shock. Having assumed away any commitment problem, we know
from the previous section that the government would rather avoid war in all cases, if it
knew the excluded group’s type. However, because of asymmetric information, the
government faces now the classic trade off between rent extraction and efficiency arising in
adverse selection problems (see e.g. Salanié, 1997). In order to bring this out, define for each
type the excluded group’s rent as the difference between the peace dividend and the return
to war :
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R g
F
y FL L
G
L
G G= + - -l m
y g( ) , and (12)
R g
F
y FH H
G
H
G G= + - -l m
y g( ) . (13)
Hence, the additional rent that the L-type group can get above that of the H-type is :
R R g g FL H L H G
H L
H L
- = - +
-æ
è
ç
ö
ø
÷l
m m
m m
( ) . (14)
The second term on the right-hand side is positive by definition. The sign of the first
one is found by looking at the incentive constraints for a truthful revelation mechanism.
They can be written in terms of peace dividends as :
l
m
l
m
g
F
g
F
L
G
L
H
G
L
+ ³ + , and (15)
l
m
l
m
g
F
g
F
H
G
H
L
G
H
+ ³ + . (16)
These conditions  say that the offer made to a group of one type must give it at least
as high a peace dividend as if it claimed to be of the other type. They can only hold
simultaneously if g gL H= . Hence, the government is unable to screen the excluded groups
according to their type by peaceful means. This implies that, if it chooses to offer an
acceptable social contract to both types, then the latter must be the same for both types, and
yield RH = 0 and R FL G
H L
H L
=
-æ
è
ç
ö
ø
÷
m m
m m
. Giving away such a rent to the L-type group is costly,
and there are cases, identified in the following proposition, where the government would
rather run the risk of a war against the H-type, provided this enabled it to extract all the rent
from the L-type group. Then, civil war works as a screening device.
Proposition 5 : Faced with the screening problem analysed here, the government chooses
the separating equilibrium, thus accepting the risk of war (ROW) with the probability p , in
the cases described in table 1.
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Table 1 : Risk of War (ROW) with Probability p
m
p
g yL
<
-
-
1
1( )
1
1
-
-
<
p
g y
m
( ) L
m
g yH
<
-
1
1( )
ROW if p
g m m
y g m
£
-
+
( )H L
H1
No ROW
1
1g y
m
( )-
< H ROW in all cases ROW if p
m m
m
£
-H L
H
Proof : See appendix.
The intuition for these results is as follows. Given the size of the m-shock, the
government will choose the pooling equilibrium, i.e. give away the informational rent to the
L-type group, if the probability of the m-shock is high, while it will prefer the separating
equilibrium, thus accepting the risk of war, if this probability is low. Similarly, given the
probability of the m-shock, the government will choose to accommodate it, in a pooling
equilibrium, if it is small, entailing the gift of a small rent to the L-type group. On the
contrary, if the m-shock is large enough, the government will rather take a chance than give
away such a large rent. In the diagonal cells of table 1, this risk is accepted when the
probability of the m-shock is small relative to its size, as explained above. In the north-east
cell of the table, the government accommodates the m-shock because its probability is
necessarily large relative to its size, as we have then 
1
1
1
1
-
-
< < <
-
p
g y
m m
g y( ) ( )L H
. In the
south-west cell of the table, we have the opposite case, where the probability of the m-shock
is necessarily small relative to its size, by a symmetric argument.
4.  A Case for a Mixed Army ?
We now analyse the potential for screening the excluded group by creating a mixed
army in peacetime, to which the potential rebels are required to contribute. Denote AL and
AH the resources so recruited. Now, the excluded group is offered a choice between two
contracts : ‘I give you either gL if you contribute AL to my army, or gH if you contribute AH,
and do not trigger a civil war subsequently in either case’. Assume that the recruitment of
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soldiers from the excluded group in peacetime entails a positive externality, such that their
relative fighting efficiency is enhanced by their participation in the governmental army.
More precisely, assume :
m n aL L LA= +  and  m n aH H HA= + , with  n nL H£  and a > 0. (17)
Let FG  denote the army left to the government in case of war, when the additional
soldiers go back to their side. Then, the incentive constraints for a truthful revelation
mechanism become:
l
m
l
m
g
F
A g
F
AL
G
L
L H
G
L
H+ - ³ + - , and (18)
l
m
l
m
g
F
A g
F
AH
G
H
H L
G
H
L+ - ³ + - . (19)
They jointly imply :
l lg A g AL L H H- = - . (20)
The rents of the two types now become :
R g A
F
y FL L L
G
L
G G= - + - -l m
y g( ) , and (21)
R g A
F
y FH H H
G
H
G G= - + - -l m
y g( ) . (22)
A separating outcome with full rent extraction is now possible, and a necessary
condition for this, with R RL H= = 0, is :
m mL H= . (23)
Condition (23) brings out the effect of the recruitment of soldiers from the excluded
group in the governmental army : it reduces the government’s uncertainty by making the
two types ‘alike’, with a common m. This requires a larger recruitment of soldiers from- and
a larger promised transfer to- the L-type, as combining (17), (20) and (23) yields :
A AL H
H L= +
-n n
a
, and (24)
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g gL H
H L= +
-n n
la
. (25)
Assume that the soldiers so recruited yield to the government a marginal utility 0 £
w < 1, to reflect the social cost of taking them away from production. We can now state:
Proposition 6 : (i) The cheapest separating contract avoiding war by requiring the excluded
groups to contribute to the peacetime defence expenditures is such that (23), (24) and (25)
hold, with AH = 0 and g y F
F
H G G
G= - -
y
l
g
l m
( )  ;
(ii) it is more costly to the government than the pooling contract of section 3.
Proof : The government solves :
min g gH L, p l w p l w g( ) ( )( )g A g A FH H L L G- + - - +1 ,
s.t.  l y g
m
g A y F
F
H H G G
G
H
³ + - -( ) , with AH ³ 0, AL ³ 0, and (20), and
      l y g
m
g A y F
F
L L G G
G
L
³ + - -( ) . (26)
This yields (23), (24), (25) and proposition 6 (i), if (26) is binding. The H-group gets
the same transfer as in the pooling contract of section 3, and the L-group a larger one. The
net expected loss is ( )( )1 1- -
-
p w
n n
a
H L . QED
A similar argument could be made by assuming a < 0, for capturing a hostage effect.
Then the L-type would get as much as in the pooling contract, and the H-type more.
5. A Glance at Some African Data
Brunetti et al. (1998) have produced some data on the credibility of the government,
based on a survey of a large number of firms in many countries performed in 1996-97. We
use as our credibility indicator the average answer to the question : ‘do you expect the
government to stick to announced major policies ?’, coded so that the highest credibility
scores six, and the lowest one1. We have restricted the sample to African countries, because
this is where civil wars are the most pressing issue. As suggested by Collier and Hoeffler
                                                 
1 Data taken from Béatrice Weder’s web site.
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(1998), ethno-linguistic fractionalisation (ELF) is an impediment to the organisation of a
successful insurrection, and we take one minus ELF as our indicator of the relative fighting
efficiency of the excluded group2. This should be regarded as a very rough proxy, as it does
not take into account the access to external support, the supplies of weaponry, etc. Then, we
have tentatively classified the sample countries as described in table 2. We regard as military
regimes the countries not at war with the highest share of military expenditures in the
central government budget, plus Nigeria, which was a military regime until recently. Some
of these classifications are disputable : Mali had a peripheral war in the north in 1990-93,
while in Zimbabwe, the political violence of the 1990s is not officially recognised as a civil
war. Côte d’Ivoire, for which the data on military expenditures is missing, could have been
classified as a military regime, because French troupes are located near Abidjan, and a coup
took place in 1999, putting a General in power for about a year.
Table 2 : Country Classification
Military Regime War in the 1990s Others :
m7 = Zambia : 2.8 w1 = Chad : 3.1 B = Bénin : 1.2
m2 = Kenya : 2.3 w2 = Congo : 2.9 CI = Côte d’Ivoire : na
m6 = Togo : 2.3 w3 = Mozambique : 5.4 Gh = Ghana : 1.4
m1 = Cameroon : 1.9 w4 = Uganda : 2.3 Gu = Guinea : 1.5
m5 = Tanzania : 1.8 w5 = Zimbabwe : 4 Mad = Madagascar : 0.9
m3 = Mali : 1.8 Mw = Malawi : 1.6
m4 = Nigeria : 0.8 Ms = Mauritius : 0.4
S = Senegal : 1.6
Note : Share of military expenditures in central government budget (from WDI 1999) beside
the country’s name.
Figure 4 presents the results of this classification, in the {credibility/fighting
efficiency} space.  The military regimes are grouped in the left-hand part of the chart, as
predicted by the model. The countries at war are located in the lower half of the credibility
                                                 
2 Data taken from Bob Bates’s web site.
16
range, as predicted, but not necessarily among the most efficient ones. Hence, some low-
probability m-shocks might have occurred here, especially in Chad and Uganda. Madagascar
was omitted as an outlier. It would be predicted to be at war, being located in the south-
eastern part of the space, while it was not. However, the Ratsiraka government was
overthrown in 1991 by a non violent popular uprising, beside the massacre of protesters in
August 1991. Therefore, despite some plausible omitted variable bias, our theoretical
predictions shed some light on these recent African data.
Figure 4
6. Conclusion
We have identified two possible causes of civil war, in a contract-theoretic
framework, assuming that two groups are facing each other, without any collective action
problem. The conflict technology allows the excluded group to overthrow the one in power,
with a given probability, if it puts in the fight enough resources relative to the government
defence expenditures. The government engages a given level of defence expenditures at the
Credibility 5.5
5.0
4.5
4.0
3.5
3.0
0.0
Fighting Efficiency
(1 minus ethno-linguistic
fractionalisation)
0.50.1 0.2 0.3 0.4
Guinea
Ma u ritiu s
Bénin
Malawi
Ghana
Sénéga l
Togo m6
Mali m3
Côte d'Ivo ire
Uganda w4
Chad w1
Kenya m2
Mozambique w3
Congo w2
Zimbabwe w5
Zambia m7
Cameroon m1
Tanzan ia m5
Nigeria m4
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initial stage, and offers a social contract promising to deliver a transfer if the excluded group
refrains from rebelling.
The first possible cause is the imperfect credibility of the government. If it is known
that the government will only keep its promise with a given probability, and default
otherwise, then the promised transfer needs to be larger, the smaller this probability. There
comes a point where the government cannot afford it and goes for a war instead. The second
cause is asymmetric information, when the potential rebels are knowingly of a more or less
efficient type for fighting, while the government only knows the probability distribution
over these types.  Then, offering a social contract that is only acceptable to the less efficient
type, thus running the risk of a war if the potential rebels are of the other type, might be for
the government a way of handling the trade off between efficiency and rent extraction.
However, the importance of this second cause of civil war depends on the availability of
alternative screening devices. Recruiting soldiers from the excluded group in the peacetime
army, thereby enhancing their fighting efficiency, might be used for screening, but is more
costly than not screening at all.
The lessons for a peace-keeping strategy are clear cut.  It is first important to help the
government enhance its credibility, and the most promising route for this is to strengthen
checks and balance1 , including an active civil society. Then, in order to mitigate asymmetric
information problem1 , a reliable system must be put in place for monitoring the degree of
political mobilisation and military potential of the excluded group. Lastly, it might be useful
to recruit and train some soldiers from the excluded group in the peacetime army, when the
context makes it feasible, but the extra cost involved must be borne by a donor if it is to be
accepted by the government.
Appendix :
1. Proof of Proposition 2.
(i)  In case of war, the government seeks to :
max ( )( )F G
W W
G GG
U p y F= - -1 g
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s.t. p F p FW G
W
G= < = ³1 if and ifw y w  ;
then it chooses F p yG
W
G³ = >w y g wand as .
(ii)  In case of peace, neglect first the budget constraint. Then, the government seeks to :
maxF G
P
G GG
U y F g= - -g l
s.t. l y g
m
w l g
m
wg y F
F
F g y F
F
FG G
G
G G G
G
G³ - - ³ ³ - - <( ) if and  if .
Then, U y F
F
F U
F
FG
P
G G
G
G G
P G
G= - - + ³ = <( )( )1 y g m
w
m
w if and if . So, it will choose
F y F gG G G³ - ³ ³w gas 0,  by the government’s budget constraint. QED
2. Proof of Proposition 5.
(i)  If it offers the same contract to both types, the government solves :
U y F g g y F
F
G
Pool
g F G G H H G G
G
H
H G
= - - ³ - -max ( ), g l l y g m
s.t. .
Then, its choice is either :
(1)  F
y
gG
H G
H
H
1
1
0
1
1
=
+
= <
-
y m
y g m
m
g y
and if
( )
, or
(2)  F g yG H G
H
H
2 1
1
= = - - >
-
w
y
l
g w
w
l m
m
g y
and if( )
( )
.
The corresponding values of its objective function are :(1)  U yGPool G
H
1
1
=
+y g m
, and
(2)  U yG
Pool
G H
H
2 1 1 1= - + - -( ) ( ( ) )y y g m
w
m
.
(ii)  If it offers a social contract that is only acceptable by the L-type, thereby accepting the
risk of war, its payoff is  :
U y F g y F
g y F
F
G
Sep
g F G G L G G
L G G
G
L
L G
= - - - + - -
³ - -
max ( )( ) ( )( )
( )
, 1 1p g l p y g
l y g
m
s .t.
Then, its choice is either :
(1)  F
y
gG
L G
L
L L
1
1
0
1
1
=
+
= <
-
-
y m
y g m
m
p
g y
and if
( )
, or
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(2)  F g yG G
L
L
2 1
1
= = - - >
-
-
w
y
l
g w
w
l m
m
p
g y
and if( )
( )
.
The corresponding values of its objective function are :
(1)  U
y
G
Sep G
L
1 1
1
=
-
+
( )y p
g y m
, and
(2)  U yG
Sep
G
L
L
2 1 1 1= - + - - -( ) ( ( ) )y
w
m
p y g m .
Then, for each of the four possible cases, one compares the values of the objective
function obtained under either choice for deriving table 1. QED
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